Active Philosophy: An Introduction Chapter 4: John Locke and the Empiricists Written

Active Philosophy: An Introduction

Chapter 4: John Locke and the Empiricists

Written by

W. Russ Payne

Bellevue College

and

Kevin Stanley

North Shore Comm. College

Edited by Kevin Stanley

2020

Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document with attribution under the terms of Creative Commons: Attribution Noncommercial 4.0 International or any later version of this license. A copy of the license is found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

John Locke and the Empiricists

From Rationalism to Empiricism: Descartes was the central figure in the philosophical tradition called Rationalism. Other major figures in the tradition are Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716). It is difficult to specify the aspects in which these thinkers and other lesser lights formed a coherent tradition. But almost all Rationalist were from Continental Europe. So they are historically referred to as the “Continental Rationalists”.

We start to understand how and why that tradition gradually gave way to Empiricism. British Philosopher, Sir Isaac Newton, proposed and demonstrated a new way to derive knowledge based on Observation and Sense Perception that led to Empiricism. All of the major Empiricists were also British. So, it became known as “British Empiricism”. The battle lines had been drawn.

In the late 1600’s and early 1700’s there was a philosophical movement that swept like a new technology would spread today (like Facebook, Twitter, or the I-Cloud technology in our time). It was an exciting time and every learned person wanted to read these new Empirical Theories all of which came from the British Isles. “British Empiricism” it would be called and its “stars” were John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Even as the fad grew in popularity, no one could predict that it would become one of the greatest philosophical battles in modern history between the Continental Rationalists (in mainland Europe) and the British Empiricists (of the British Isles). It had a huge effect on American Philosophy and on the development of Science as well. The Scientific Method exists because of Empiricism.

Paradigms of Knowledge: Perhaps the central feature that distinguishes a Rationalist from an Empiricist is the model that he takes as representing the best example of knowledge. At the time of Descartes there was no competition. The best example of knowledge was the geometry of the ancients. Euclid’s theorems were certain; no other science could claim nearly as much. Thus for Descartes and the Rationalists, genuine knowledge was expected to follow the pattern of geometry—starting with axioms, definitions, and postulates, and rigorously deducing theorems. Spinoza went so far as to write his Ethics in the form of a geometry text, starting with axioms and proceeding to theorems.

Rationalism, you should recall, is the view that all of our knowledge is ultimately acquired through and by REASON. It uses CERTAINTY as a necessary condition for Knowledge (Justified, True, Belief).

But the Empiricists change the criteria for knowledge. They argue that “reasonably high probability” is both a sufficient and a necessary condition for knowledge. They agree with the Rationalists that Knowledge = Justified, True, Belief. But they disagree that “justified” necessarily means Certainty. Reasonably high probability is all that is required for Knowledge so long as it is reasoned to properly.

Empiricism is the view that all of our knowledge is ultimately acquired through and by sense experience. It uses tools like Collection of Data; Verification; Observation; Hypothesis; and Inference to the Best Explanation with the goal of reaching “Reasonably High Probability” as a justification for knowledge.

Here we explore the teachings of three major empiricist thinkers: John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.

John Locke

John Locke (1632 –1704) is better known now for his political thought than his Empiricism. But his Epistemology and Empiricist contribution is just as important. Locke spent time in Holland as a young man and his political thought was probably influenced significantly by Spinoza who had died only recently. Locke argued against the divine right of kings to rule and instead defended a liberal egalitarian political philosophy on which people have equal and natural rights to liberty. Liberty, in Locke’s thought, should be understood as being free from domination by others. Liberty is not in Locke’s view being free to do whatever one pleases. For starters, if everyone is to be free from domination, then it follows that nobody is free to dominate. Locke also offers the classic justification for property rights as an extension of our self-ownership. So property rights are seen as natural extensions of our human liberty. The point of government is just to secure our natural liberties to the highest degree possible on Locke’s view. So government is legitimate only when it is limited to this role. This view should sound familiar. Locke’s political philosophy was influential with the founding fathers of the United States. Thomas Jefferson in particular was a close student of Locke’s political thought. In fact, Jefferson lifted entire paragraphs from Locke’s work on occasion. In addition to his philosophical concerns and political activity, Locke was a religious thinker of some importance. And, just in case you were wondering what he did with his spare time, he was also a physician.

Locke’s Epistemology

Locke develops his empiricist epistemology in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke’s approach is to examine the origins of the contents of the mind. Early in this work he argues against innate ideas. The mind starts off as a tablula rasa, a blank slate. All of our ideas have their origin in experience. Simple ideas, say of solidity and figure, are acquired through the senses, and from these we form complex ideas, say the idea of a dog, through the capacities of the understanding. The details of this account raise a number of challenging questions. We might think of Locke as launching a research program for developing an empiricist account of the mind rather than spelling out a fully developed view. But it is cohesive and remains foundational in Modern Psychology.

Locke’s Solution to the Ego-Centric Problem

Rejecting Descartes’ Standard of Certainty: In attempting to understand Locke’s arguments, it is crucial to realize that he is partly rejecting Descartes’ problem. Descartes wanted to establish the existence and nature of the material world with certainty. The sort of certainty he sought was the sort that attaches to the conclusions of a proof in geometry. Locke set for himself a less demanding project. He wanted to prove that the material world exists, and he wanted to show that we could know what the material world is like. But Locke is not concerned to demonstrate his conclusions with certainty. Indeed, he says that the existence of the material world cannot be proven with the degree of certainty that is achieved by geometric proofs. But this, Locke argues, does not mean that we cannot justify our belief in the material world. The laws discovered by Newton are a prime example of knowledge, a prime example of the sort of beliefs we are thoroughly justified in holding. Yet these are not known with certainty. Locke hoped to show that the existence of the mind external world could be established on a basis as firm as the foundation of Newtonian science. To ask for more, he claimed, is unrealistic and unnecessary. To be as certain as Newtonian science is to be certain enough. Thus, the justification for “knowledge” requires only reasonably high probability.

“A Priori” vs. “A Posteriori” Knowledge

It is important here to get clear on a key distinction in Philosophy. “A Priori” and “A Posteriori” are different types of statements of knowledge. They are Latin phrases used in philosophy to identify two types of knowledge, justification, or argument, characterized by the use of experiential/empirical evidence, or a lack thereof. More precisely, these terms are used with respect to epistemology in order to distinguish between “necessary conclusions from first premises” (i.e., what must come before sense observation, or empirical knowledge) and “conclusions based on sense observation” which must follow it.

A Priori: In English, it literally means “Prior to”. It is a statement of knowledge, justification, or argument that is known independently from experience. Examples include mathematics (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4); tautologies/definitions (e.g. “all bachelors are unmarried males of a marriageable age”); and deduction from pure reason (e.g., ontological proofs).

A Priori definition: Something that can be known PRIOR to Experience. An expression of an A Priori truth is given in the form of an Analytic Statement (e.g. All Triangles have three sides).

A Posteriori: In English is literally means “Post or After”. It is a statement of knowledge, justification, or argument that is known AFTER and dependent on experience. This type of knowledge, justification, or argument depend on experience or empirical evidence. Examples include most aspects of science and personal knowledge.

A Posteriori definition: Something that can only be known AFTER Experience. An expression of an A Posteriori truth is given in the form of a Synthetic Statement (e.g. My hair is brown).

Locke’s Argument for the Existence of Body (Matter)

Locke’s argument for the existence of the mind external world (matter) uses A Posteriori knowledge as a starting point. It also is a classic instance of a hypothetical-deductive argument (also known as Inference to the Best Explanation). The strategy is as follows: First we note a number of facts about the subject at hand. We then make a hypothesis. The claim is that the hypothesis, if true, would explain how the facts came to be so, and further, that the hypothesis is the best (or perhaps even the only) explanation of the facts. The claim is that we should accept the hypothesis that offers the best explanation of the facts. This is just the strategy followed in Newtonian physics: we note certain facts about the paths of the planets and the behavior of falling bodies, and then we make a hypothesis—that bodies attract each other with a force proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. The hypothesis is accepted because it explains the facts better than any competing hypothesis.

Two competing hypothesis put to the test of Inference to the Best Explanation

Solipsist Hypotheses: Matter does NOT exist. “I” am the only thinking think in the universe and everything is either my own, personal perception or my imagination.

Locke’s Hypotheses: Matter DOES exist. There is a mind external world available to others.

1. Puzzles for the Solipsist Hypothesis: In attempting to argue that the existence of the mind external world of matter (or material substance) is the best explanation for the facts of our experience, Locke points to a pair of facts that would seem to be quite unexplainable to the solipsist hypothesis or others who think the world of matter does not exist.

a. The first observation is that our sense data are largely beyond our control. It is not in our power simply to decide what sort of sensations or perceptions we shall have. Try as I might, I cannot make my headache go away. I can close my eyes and see nothing. But I cannot simply decide that my sense data will be those appropriate to a warm, sunny beach. This must surely be something of a puzzle for a solipsist. For if the solipsist believes that he is the only entity in the universe, then how does he explain the fact that his own perceptions are largely beyond his control?

Solipsist reply: Maybe I am just not good enough at controlling my personal perceptions. So, all perceptions might still be only mine. There is nothing stopping me from having a perception of me driving to the beach and being there!

Locke’s reply: Nevertheless, once you get to the beach, you cannot control whether it is sunny or not. In short, your hypothesis (that YOU are the only thinking thing and the only perceiver) is NOT the best one.

b. A second observation is that our sense data exhibit a highly patterned coherence. When I see a table and reach out my arm, I also touch the table and feel it. If there is a fire burning in my fireplace and I look away for a while, the sense data I have on looking back are those appropriate to a fire that has burned for a while. If while I am not looking at the fire, I hear a log crackle and break, and if I then turn and look at the fire, I will see a broken log. Examples like this could be extended indefinitely. They all point to the same obvious conclusion: our sense data are not a “buzzing, blooming confusion” but rather they display a well-patterned coherent structure. This fact too must be a problem for the solipsist. For if he is the only thing in the universe, what is it that causes his sense data to be so tightly patterned?

Locke’s Hypothesis – Matter Exists

The solution to these two puzzles is easy, according to Locke. We can explain them both by accepting the hypothesis that we all make all the time (i.e. Matter Exists). “Material Substance” as Locke called it, exists outside of our minds, and our perceptions are caused (in part) by this matter. Thus we can explain why I cannot control my sense data. They are caused by material substances which exist quite independently of my mind. We can also explain why our sense data exhibit such coherence. My sensations of a fire are caused by material objects (burning logs), which behave in certain ways quite independently of my mind. It is the patterned behavior of matter that explains the patterned behavior of my sense data; it is the matter that causes the sense data (for veridical perceptions). Common sense and observation; collection of data; and EXPERIENCE allows us to conclude the existence of matter (body) outside of our minds by using Inference to Best Explanation. We do not need to prove the existence of an “All Perceiver” (God) as Descartes believed. In short, we do not need to be certain.

Locke’s Account of Sense Perception

Penetrating the Screen vs. Describing the Other Side: Thus far Locke has done only half the job of penetrating the screen of perception, and the easier half at that. He has argued that matter exists. There is something beyond our own mind and the contents of our mind. But he has not, so far, told us anything interesting about matter. All he has argued is that matter exists and is part of the cause of our perception. But what is matter like? If we grant the soundness of Locke’s arguments for the existence of matter, we must still ask how do we justify our beliefs about matter? Since most of our knowledge of the mind external world comes from perception, the question reduces to the question of, “What does sense data tell us about the nature of matter”?

Naive Representationalism: Perhaps the simplest account of the nature of perception is naive representationalism. This view, which Locke rejects, holds that our sense data are, in every detail, an accurate picture or representation of the material substance that causes them. If we pick up a warm brown kitten, we have sense data of warmth, brown color, a certain shape, etc. Each of these properties of our sense data, according to the naive representationalist, corresponds to properties in the matter, which causes the sense data. The properties in the matter resemble the properties of the sense data, just as my face on the monitor screen resembles my face in the flesh.

Locke’s Limited Representationalism: Locke agreed with the naive representationalist that some of the properties of our sense data resemble properties of the matter that cause sense data. However, according to Locke, not all properties of our sense data resemble properties of matter. Humans have a “limited representation” of reality (matter) based on our own physiology and way we perceive.

1. Primary and Secondary Qualities: Those properties of our sense data that do resemble the properties of the material objects that cause them Locke calls primary qualities. The properties of our sense data that do not resemble the properties of material objects Locke called secondary qualities.

a. The primary qualities, according to Locke, are motion, number, solidity, shape, and size. These qualities actually exist in matter.

b. The secondary qualities, according to Locke, are color, taste, smell, tactile feelings, and temperature. These qualities exist only in minds!

Defending the distinction: Why does Locke think that some sensory qualities resemble qualities in material objects while others do not? Locke gives a pair of reasons.

The first is called the variance argument: Objects often appear to have different secondary qualities to different observers, or even to the same observer. But if an object appears to have incompatible sensory properties to two different observers, it is impossible that the object actually has qualities which resemble each of these incompatible properties. Schematically, if an object appears to have a secondary property A to one observer and a secondary property B to another observer, and if A and B are incompatible, then it is impossible that there can be a material object with properties that actually resemble the sense data that the object causes. If so, then the object would have to have properties resembling both A and B (which are incompatible). For example, imagine the case where one hand has been in hot water and the other has been in ice water. Both hands are now plunged into a pail of lukewarm water. One hand feels cool, the other feels warm. Clearly there cannot be a property of the water that resembles both the warm feeling and the cool feeling. Also, when I put my finger into a candle flame, I feel pain. But surely pain does not exist in the flame. The pain exists in my mind. Similar arguments can be constructed for each of the other secondary qualities. Another good example is hearing. The primary quality (motion) is the frequency of the sound wave. But the SOUND only exists when the sound wave affects the mind. I can blow a dog whistle (that produces sound waves beyond human capacity-a primary quality) and you will insist that the whistle makes no sound or sound waves. But it is obvious that it does because the dog reacts to the sound wave. Why? Because the dog has the equipment to translate the primary quality (motion of sound waves) into sound in his canine mind!

The second is called the Consonance with Physics: Another consideration advanced by Locke in support of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is the consonance of the distinction within Newtonian physics. Newtonian matter has primary qualities but no secondary qualities. The secondary qualities that characterize our sense of data (color, taste, etc.) arise from the interaction of primary qualities in material objects with the organs of perception. Thus, in Newtonian science, taste and smell are to be explained by the size and shape of the molecules. Temperature was later explained by the motion of particles. The microwave oven is a prime example. The particles themselves have no temperature, no color, no taste or smell. Color, taste and smell are the effects these particles have on our sensory system. So the conclusion is that the mind external world (matter) is tasteless, odorless, silent, devoid of temperature, colorless and stark. Sounds like outer space, a void. Does that seem correct to you?

Skepticism Arises: A fundamental problem persists. The goal of all Epistemologists is to DEFEAT the skeptic and his assertion that humans really do not “know” with even reasonably high probability. How do we know, if Locke is correct, that our “human” perception of secondary qualities are even close to the reality of the mind external world? How do I know that “my” perceptions are more correct than that of a dog (who by the way can perceive smells and sounds much better than me)? Furthermore, am I to believe that we live in a colorless, tasteless, odorless universe? I thought Locke was claiming to give us a “common sense” account of knowledge. In short, do you really feel like a “knower” based on Locke’s account? Are we really any closer to getting out of the Ego-Centric Problem? It is hard to establish the “Reasonably High Probability” of my perceptions by testing them with 100, 1000, 1 million other human perceptions. Of course they are likely to be the same. Why? Because we humans are built the same and have the same sensory equipment.

Case in point: Let’s say we want to prove that there is a “reasonably high probility” that only AM radio waves exist. We could be fooled into thinking this is true if we only used AM radios to prove this. We could bring thousands of AM radios to test this hypothesis and then easily conclude “only AM radio waves exist” with high probability. Why? Because that is how AM radios are built! The radio is like the “mind” in this case and its representation of reality is limited to the way the AM radio is built. Similarly, the human mind is limited to view reality based by the way it is built. So how do we know that reality is not much bigger and quite different than the way our brains work?

Of course Locke understands this objection. His defenders might reply: “I did not promise that you were going to like the conclusion”. We ARE limited in our representation of the mind external world to the way our brains are built. This is why Locke called his theory “Limited Representationalism”. Furthermore, not all experience depends on having simple ideas had through sense experience, Locke does not take experience to be limited to these. We also have experience of the operations of the mind in building up complex ideas out of simple ideas based on abstraction. Also, humans are very clever at “expanding our senses” with the use of machines and optics and processors to help us view and examine the Microscopic and Macroscopic universe with the invention of microscopes, computers, and telescopes. Once you have some simple ideas through sense experience, you also have an experience of yourself and of your mental operations on those simple ideas. So given simple ideas through experience, combined with sense expanding equipment, the operations of the mind become a source for further ideas and clarity. Hume, who also raises these types of objections and pushes empiricism to its limits, is not so optimistic.

Summary: John Locke is an Empiricist in Epistemology and a type of Dualist in Metaphysics. He is regarded as the Father of Empiricism, but he did not attempt to detail his Metaphysics that much. But it is obvious that he accepts Materialism given that the existence of matter is the hypothesis he introduces and defends. He also separated mind from body (matter) by arguing that Secondary Qualities “exist only in the mind”. Since the mind contains ideas that he did not try to explain in materialistic terms, we can infer that his Metaphysics agrees with and is sympathetic with Dualism.

Footnote: We will never know if Locke would have accepted modern reductive materialism (the view that even ideas are “matter”-simply neurons and neuro-chemicals in the brain). This view only arose in the 20th century with the advent of neurology and neuro-philosophy.

George Berkeley (pronounced BARK-lee)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is best known for arguing for Idealism on Empiricist grounds. In metaphysics, Idealism is the view that there is no physical substance underlying our sense impressions of the world. Rather, the world consists entirely of ideas. Your mind is just a bundle of impressions, and there is nothing in the world except for so many minds having their various perceptions. Berkeley defends this as the view that best accords with common sense in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.

Berkeley’s argument attacks Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities and argues that all of our sense impressions are mere appearances and that we have no grounds for thinking that any of them bear any resemblance to the way things are. Since we lack any empirical experience of the underlying substances in which qualities exist. We have no empirical reason to suppose underlying substances even exist. All we have access to are our sense impressions, and these are mental things, ideas. So all we can claim knowledge of are our ideas beginning with our sense impressions, the most basic ideas.

Berkeley also argues that positing underlying substances do no significant explanatory work. So, the common sense empiricist view ought to be that we live in a world of ideas that lacks any underlying physical substance. This startling view might make us wonder what happens to my desk when I leave the room and cease to perceive it. Does it pop out of existence when I leave and then pop back into existence just as it was when I return to my work? This would be most peculiar. Berkeley argues that the objects of our everyday life do have an enduring existence when we are absent. They continue to exist as ideas in the mind of God. Given this appeal to the

mind of God to explain the continued existence of things we aren’t actively observing, we might argue that positing underlying substances does some explanatory work after all and charge that Berkeley has only substituted one unobservable theoretical posit, God, for another, underlying substances.

But it is worth mentioning that many in 21st Century Philosophy and Theoretical Physics are advancing theories of “Streams of Consciousness” where the universe is fundamentally a mental. “Consciousness Stream” where our minds connect to interact in existence and with reality. With Berkeley and such theories, at least there is no “artificial” barrier between the knower and reality.

Our minds contain ideas, and the universe is fundamentally a collection of ideas.

It is also worth noting that Albert Einstein once stated, “It was only after I read George Berkeley that I awoke from my dogmatic slumbers”. What he meant by this is: Berkeley persuasively argued that all perceptions are relative to the perceiver. So Einstein extended this idea and concluded that even “time” is relative to the perceiver.

But is any case, many philosophers (including Locke and David Hume) prefer an epistemology where being able to “know” does not necessitate the existence of any particular God. Most philosophers regard this as a type of reverting back to anthropomorphism that Thales set to rest thousands of year ago.

David Hume

Of the philosophers discussed here, David Hume (1711-1776) has probably had the greatest influence on contemporary analytic philosophy. The twentieth century begins with a movement known as Logical Positivism that tests the limits of Empiricism. The Empiricism of the Logical Positivists is heavily indebted to Hume.

Hume’s empiricist epistemology is grounded in his philosophy of mind. Hume starts by asking what we have in the mind and where these things come from. He divides our mental representations into two categories, the relatively vivid impressions, these include sensations and feelings, and the less vivid ideas which include memories and ideas produced by the imagination. Since Hume thinks that every idea is either simple or complex, and that a complex idea is entirely made up of simple ones, it follows that every idea is either an exact copy of an impression, or is entirely made up of such copies. What distinguishes impressions from ideas in our experience is just their vividness. The picture of the mind Hume offers is one where all of our beliefs and representations are cooked up out of basic ingredients provided by experience. Our experience gives us only impressions through sense experience (what is labeled as Veridical Perceptions earlier) and internal impressions like feelings and memories, and imagination (what is labeled as types of Phenomenological Perceptions earlier). From this we generate less vivid ideas. Memories are merely faint copies of impressions. Through the imagination we can generate further ideas by recombining elements of ideas we already have. So through impressions we get the idea of a lizard and the idea of a bird. We can then generate the idea of a dragon by imaginatively combining elements of each. In cooking up new ideas from old ideas, the imagination is guided by associating relations like resemblance, contiguity (next-to-ness) and cause and effect. So, for example, an impression of a grapefruit might lead me to think of an orange due to their similarity. The thought of my bicycle might lead me to think of the table saw it is parked next to in the basement. Through the association of cause and effect, my idea of a struck match leads me to the idea of a flame. The last of these principles of association, cause and effect, turns out to be faulty for reasons we will examine shortly.

The imagination is not merely a source of fancy and fiction. The imagination also includes our ability to understand things when we reason well in formulating new ideas from old ones. A priori reasoning, which is reasoning independent of experience, can produce understanding of relations of ideas. For example, the statement “A triangle is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles” does not tell us anything new about the world. It is a mere definition.

Mathematical and logical reasoning is like this also. When I recognize the validity of an argument or the logic behind a mathematical proof, the understanding I attain is just a matter of grasping relations between ideas. So, a priori reasoning only reveals logical relations between ideas. It tells us nothing about matters of fact. Our ability to understand matters of fact, say truths about the external world, depends entirely on a posteriori reasoning, or reasoning

based on experience. It depends on the condition of the universe at a particular time. As we will see, our ability to reason about matters of fact doesn’t get us very far.

More on next page

Often our philosophical confusion is the result of having added more than we are entitled to add to our experience when we are striving to understand it. Hume aims to correct many of these errors and, in doing so, he aims to delineate the limits of human knowledge and understanding. As it turns out, we don’t know as much as we commonly suppose, in Hume’s opinion. The result of Hume’s rigorous Empiricism is skepticism about a great many things. Some of Hume’s skeptical results are not so surprising given his Empiricism. Hume is skeptical about objective moral truths, for instance. We don’t get to observe rightness and wrongness in the way we can see colors and shapes, for instance. The idea that there are objective moral truths, according to Hume, is a mistaken projection of our subjective moral sentiments.

Hume is not worried, however, that his subjectivism about morality will lead to moral anarchy. Note that the opinion that it’s OK to do whatever you want is itself a moral opinion. So, for the subjectivist, “anything goes” is no more rationally justified than any other moral opinion. While Hume does think that morality is concerned with subjective sentiments, not objective facts, the lack of objective moral truths won’t corrupt us or undermine the social order because we all have pretty much the same sorts of moral sentiments and we can base a sensible social order on these. While we may feel differently about specific practices or principles, Hume thinks we have a basis for negotiating our moral differences in our more general and more or less universally shared moral sentiments of self-love, love for others, and concern for happiness. Hume believed we all share some form of empathy towards others.

Hume’s skepticism about objective moral truths now strikes many people as common sense. But the empiricist epistemology that leads him to subjectivism about morality also leads him to skepticism about causation, the external world, inductive reasoning, about God, and even about the self. We’ll examine these further skeptical conclusions starting with causation.

Causation

When we examine our everyday idea of causation, Hume says we find four component ideas:

the idea of a constant conjunction of cause and effect (whenever the cause occurs, the effect follows).

the idea of the temporal priority of the cause (the cause happens first, then the effect).

the idea of causes and effects being contiguous (next to each other) in space and time.

the idea of a necessary connection between the cause and the effect.

So, for instance, the idea that striking a match causes it to light is made up of the idea that whenever similar matches are struck (under the right conditions), they light, plus the idea of the striking happening first, and the idea of the striking and the lighting happen right next to each other in time and space, and, finally, the idea that the striking somehow necessitates or

makes the match light. Now let’s consider these component ideas and ask whether they all have an empirical basis in corresponding sense impressions. We do have sense impressions of the first three: the constant conjunction of cause and effect, the temporal priority of the cause, and the contiguity of cause and effect. But Hume argues that we lack any corresponding empirical impression of necessary connections between causes and effects. We don’t observe anything like the cause making the effect occur. As Hume puts the point,

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII)

The idea of causes necessitating their effects, according to Hume’s analysis, is a confused projection of the imagination for which we find no basis in experience. For this reason, Hume denies that we have rational grounds for thinking that causes do necessitate their effects.

The Mind External World

All of our reasoning about the mind external world is based on the idea of causation. So the skepticism that follows from Hume’s skepticism about causation is quite far reaching. Our beliefs about the mind external world, for instance, are based on the idea that things going on in the external world cause our sense impressions. We have no rational grounds for thinking so, says Hume. More generally, our evidence for what we can know begins with our impressions, the mental representations of sense experience. We assume that our impressions are a reliable guide to the way things are, but this is an assumption we can’t rationally justify. We have no experience beyond our impressions that could rationally certify that our impressions correspond in any way to an external reality. Our assumption that our impressions do correspond to an external reality is a rationally unsupportable product of our imagination.

Induction

Closely related to Hume’s skepticism about causation is Hume’s skepticism about inductive reasoning. Inductive argument, in its standard form, draws a conclusion about what is generally the case, or what will prove to be the case in some as yet unobserved instance, from some limited number of specific observations. The following is an example of a typical inductive argument:

Every observed sample of water heated to well over 100 C has boiled.

Therefore, whenever water is heated to well over 100 C, it boils.

Unless every instance of water heated to over 100C in the history of the universe is among the observed instances, we can’t be sure that the conclusion is true given the truth of the premises. But then what justifies the inference from the premise to the conclusion of an inductive argument?

Hume considers the suggestion that every inductive argument has a principle of induction as a suppressed premise, and it is this principle of induction that renders the inference from premises to conclusion rational. This principle of induction tells us roughly that unobserved instances follow the pattern of observed instances. So inductive arguments really go something like this:

Every observed sample of water heated to over 100 C has boiled.

(Unobserved cases tend to follow the pattern of observed cases)

So, whenever water is heated to over 100 C, it boils.

Of course the argument still isn’t valid, but that’s not what we are aiming for in induction. Given the hidden second premise – our principle of induction – we can reasonably hold that the premises taken together give us good grounds to accept that the conclusion is probably true. However, if this principle of induction (2 above) is to render inductive inferences rational, then we need some grounds for thinking that it is true. In considering how this principle of induction is to be justified, Hume presents a dilemma. Since there is no contradiction in denying the principle of induction, it cannot be justified a-priori (independent of our experience as can be done with logical truths). And any empirical argument would be inductive and therefore beg the question by appealing to the very principle of induction that requires support. So, Hume concludes, we have no rational grounds for accepting inductive inferences.

Think about the ramifications of Hume’s skepticism about induction. If inductive argument is not rational, then we have no reason at all to think the sun will rise tomorrow. Here we aren’t worried about improbably possibilities like the sun getting blown to bits by aliens before tomorrow morning. Hume’s argument against the rationality of inductive reasoning implies that all of our experience of the sun regularly rising gives us no reason to think its rising tomorrow is even likely to happen. If this sounds crazy, then we have a problem because it is not easy to find a defect in Hume’s reasoning. This is why philosophers speak of this topic as the Problem of Induction. Very few are prepared to accept Hume’s skepticism about induction. But in the two and a half centuries that have passed since Hume died, we have yet to settle on a satisfactory solution to the problem of induction. We’ll take a closer look at this problem when we take up the Philosophy of Science in the next chapter.

The Self

Descartes didn’t hesitate to infer the existence of himself from the certainty of his thinking. And it seems obvious to most of us that having thoughts implies the existence of a subject that thinks. Hume is more cautious on this point.

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.” (Treatise, 1.4.6.3)

The contents of our immediate experience are just particular impressions and ideas. But we have no experience of any single unified self that is the subject of those experiences. The idea of a self, including the idea of the self as a soul, is a fanciful projection from our experiences. All we can say in an empirically grounded way of ourselves, according to Hume, is that we are just a bundle of experiences.

We’ve given just given the briefest sketch of how Hume reaches his assorted skeptical conclusions. There are many further arguments and objections to consider, but hopefully we’ve covered enough to give you an appreciation for how carefully a strict and carefully reasoned Empiricism leads to a variety of skeptical conclusions. Hume’s skepticism about causation and induction may be the most surprising. We often hold up science as the paradigm of human intellectual achievement, and we tend to think of science as pretty empirical. Yet Hume’s strict Empiricism seems to undercut science on the key notions of causation and induction. Perhaps scientific inquiry is not as strictly empirical as Hume’s epistemology. Or perhaps, as some have argued, science can get along fine without induction or causation. Still, if we are not comfortable with Hume’s skepticism about causation and induction, this might be cause to reconsider his Empiricism. And perhaps also the skepticism about morality it seems to invite. In any case, “reasonably high probability” is NOT “certainty”.

God

Unlike Locke and Berkeley, Hume’s rigorous Empiricism leads him to skepticism about religious matters. To avoid censorship or persecution, critics of religious belief in the 18th century exercised caution in various ways. Hume’s earliest challenge to religious belief, an essay on miracles, was removed from his early work, his Treatise of Human Nature, and published only in his later Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding. In this essay, Hume argues that the belief in miracles can never be rational. A miracle is understood to be a violation of the laws of nature resulting from Divine will. But, argues Hume, the weight of the evidence of our experience overall will always give us stronger reason to mistrust our senses in the case of a

seemingly miraculous experience than to doubt the otherwise consistently regular course of events in our experience. Testimony by others of miracles is on even shakier ground.

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. (Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, Section 10)

Among educated people in the 18th century, religious belief was thought to be supported not just by Divine revelation, but by our experience of the natural world as well. When we look to the natural world we find impressive harmony in the natural order of things. The various species all seem well suited to their environments and ecological stability is maintained by the various roles organism play in their environments. To the discerning mind in search of an explanation, the order and harmony we find in the world looks very much like the deliberate work of a Divine creator. This line of thought is known as the Argument from Design. Hume’s last work, his posthumously published Dialogues of Natural Religion, aimed to undermine many arguments for the existence of God, including the Design Argument.

According to Hume, the Design Argument is a weak argument by analogy. We have reason to think that machines are the product of human design because we are familiar with their means of production. But we have no analogue in the case of the universe. We have not observed its creation. The alleged similarity of the universe to machines designed by humans is also suspect. We do find regularities in nature, but only in the small corner of nature we are familiar with. The regularity, order, and harmony we do find don’t provide enough of the appearance of design to warrant positing an intelligent designer, according to Hume. But suppose we do think the natural world bears the marks of a designer’s craftsmanship. The only sorts of designers we are familiar with are people like us. But that doesn’t tell us much about what sorts of being could be designers of complex harmonious systems. So even assuming we find the appearance of design in nature, we have little grounds to think that it is the product of a personal god or any sort of entity we can relate to.

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection provides a naturalistic account of the appearance of design in life forms. Thanks to providing a developed naturalistic alternative to the hypothesis of design by a Divine creator, Darwin probably had the greater impact in undermining the design argument for the existence of God. Darwin cites Hume as among his major influences, and there are a number of passages in Hume’s writing that foreshadow insights that Darwin developed.

We will take a look at the classic “Proofs for the Existence of God” in another chapter.

Immanuel Kant: An Epistemological Compromise

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a hugely influential philosopher that you will undoubtedly meet if you take an Ethics course. He was also profound in Epistemology. His theories are a bit too complex to go into here. But you are likely to meet him if you take an upper level Philosophy course. Kant tried to synthesize the epistemological views of the rationalists and empiricists in The Critique of Pure Reason (1781; second edition 1787). There he sought to determine the limits and scope of metaphysics by an extended examination of Epistemology. Contemporary Philosophers are still fascinated by Kant’s work and continue to seek answers in this important area of Philosophy.

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